LIABILITY AND ADMISSIONS OF WRONGDOING IN PUBLIC
ENFORCEMENT OF LAW
Samuel W Buell*
Some judges and scholars have questioned the social value of the
standardform in which the Securities and Exchange Commission settles
its corporate enforcement actions, including the agency's use of
essentially unreviewed consent decrees that include no admission of
liability or wrongdoing. This essay, for a symposium on SEC
enforcement, provides an analysis of the deterrent effects of the three
main components of settlements in public enforcement of law: liability,
admission, and remedy. The conclusions are the following. All three
components can have beneficial deterrent effects. Cost considerations
nonetheless justify some settlements that dispense with liability or
admission, or even both. But a practice of uniformly institutionalizing
settlements without admissions, such that the deterrent effects of
admissions are never realized, even for bargaining leverage, is not
justified. Further,there is reason to believe that some form ofjudicial
review of enforcement settlements would contribute to deterrence. To
put the argument another way, agencies engaged in public civil
enforcement could learn somethingfrom contemplating why the federal
criminaljustice system strongly disfavors nolo contendere pleas and
why a plea bargaining system dominated by nolo pleas would be so
undesirableas to be unthinkable.

In public enforcement of law, settlement is the norm. Over ninetyfive percent of federal criminal cases result in pleas of guilty, and the
rate is not much lower in state courts.' Rates are still lower among
criminal defendant corporations, for which trials are hens' teeth.2 In the
noncriminal area, enforcement actions brought by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for violations of the federal securities

* Professor, Duke University School of Law. For helpful comments, many thanks to
participants in the University of Cincinnati College of Law's Corporate Law Center's Twenty-Sixth
Annual Symposium.
1. Between 2005 and 2011, about ninety-seven percent of all federal criminal cases resulted in a
guilty plea. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICS DIVISION, STATISTICAL TABLES

FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, Table D-4, Criminal Defendants Disposed of by Type of Disposition and
Offense (Excluding Transfers) During a 12-month Period (2005-2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/StatisticalTablesArchive.a
sp; see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
2. See Jennifer Arlen, Economic Analysis of Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK INCRIMINAL LAW 144, 148 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds.,
2012).
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laws, for example, almost never result in trials. In 2011, the SEC
pursued 735 enforcement actions. 3 Very few of those actions resulted in
trials.4
If public enforcement of law-particularly in the realm of business
conduct-is primarily aimed at deterring law violations, one must assess
the performance of enforcement institutions by examining the deterrent
effect of settlements.
Settlement of a legal claim in a public
enforcement action typically includes one or more of three components:
attachment of legal liability; establishment or admission of the factual
basis for that liability, as well as perhaps for additional liability avoided;
and sanctions. Current practice uses a variety of arrangements involving
these three components.
In this Essay, I examine the deterrent effects of these three aspects of
enforcement settlements and conclude that admissions of liability should
not be uniformly, or even typically, excluded from enforcement
settlements. Doing so gives up too much of the public benefits of
government enforcement of law. The issue of admissions has been a
lively topic of late in the field of securities enforcement. This Essay is
partly an intervention in that discussion and partly an occasion to step
back from that debate and consider the issues on a somewhat more
theoretical plane. Part I provides analysis of deterrence mechanisms in
enforcement settlements. Part II provides normative insights.
I. COMPONENTS OF ENFORCEMENT SETTLEMENTS

Criminal cases resolved by guilty plea generally include both
attachment of liability (the conviction imposed by the judge after the
defendant pleads guilty) and a factual admission of legal wrongdoing
(the plea "allocution" that is required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure5 ). But not always. Rule 11 permits continued use
of the old common law device of the nolo contendere plea, which
involves the attachment of liability (conviction upon plea of guilty)

3. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Enforcement Division Produces Record Results in
Safeguarding Investors and Markets, Release No. 2011-234 (Nov. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-234.htm; Testimony of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division
of Enforcement, SEC, HearingExamining the Settlement Practicesof U.S. FinancialRegulators, House
Committee
on
Fin.
Servs.,
May
17,
2012,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts051712rk.htm.
4. According to the SEC's Chief Litigation Counsel, the agency "litigated," in any form, about
40 to 50 cases in 2011. See Joshua Gallu, SEC Trials Increase 50 Percent as Execs Fight Lawsuits,
Bloomberg, May 22, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-22/sec-trialsincrease-50-percent-as-execs-fight-lawsuits.html (reporting that the SEC litigation director said the
agency was "actively litigating" 90 cases, which was a 50 percent increase over the prior year).
5. FED. R. CRIM4. P. 11I(b)(3).
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without any factual admission of wrongdoing by the defendant.6 Under
North Carolinav. Alford,7 it is also constitutionally permissible, though
not a matter of right, for a defendant to plead guilty and be criminally
sanctioned, while affirmatively denying any factual basis for a finding
of wrongdoing. In other words, one can plead guilty but say one is
innocent. A primary distinction between the two forms of liability is
that an Alford plea still requires the court tp find a factual basis for
guilt,8 whereas, a nolo plea is viewed as involving no actual factual
inquiry into guilt and therefore has no collateral estoppel effect in civil
litigation. 9 (The defendant in Alford said, "I pleaded guilty on second
degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain't
shot no man.... I'm not guilty but I plead guilty."10 )
The government seriously frowns on nolo and Alford pleas."
Department of Justice (DOJ) policy instructs federal prosecutors not to
sign any plea agreement with a defendant who seeks to enter such a plea
unless "the most unusual circumstances" justify an exception and
approval has been obtained at the highest levels of DOJ. 12 DOJ also
tells its prosecutors that if a court allows a defendant to enter a nolo or
Alford plea to one or more charges in an indictment, the prosecutor
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(a)(1); see Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 453-57 (1926)
(holding that use of the nolo contendere plea is not limited to cases in which the penalty is only a fine
and finding the common law history of the plea to be both murky and without support for the claim that
punishment in such cases could not include imprisonment); see also Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421,
426-27 (1961) (stating that a nolo plea is an admission that the elements of the offense are well-pleaded
but is not a determination of guilt). The nolo plea became an institution of American criminal procedure
largely as a means of resolving criminal antitrust cases without thereby conceding liability in civil treble
damages actions. See Note, Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases,79 HARv. L. REv. 1475 (1966).
7. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
8. Id. at 32-33, 35 n.8, 38 n.10.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes 1966 Amends.; Blohm v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 994 F.2d 1542, 1553-55 (1lth Cir. 1993). A nolo plea is still a conviction for other purposes,
such as triggering recidivism penalties in future cases. United States v. Brzoticky, 588 F.2d 773, 77475 (10th Cir. 1978).
10. Alford, 400 U.S. at 28 n.2.
11. It appears that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure viewed retention of
the common law nolo plea as a somewhat close call. See NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
THE SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AND THE FEDERAL BAR
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND CONNECTICUT, VI FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 162, 187 (Hon. Alexander Holtzoff ed., 1946) (remarks of G. Aaron Youngquist: "There is
some objection to permitting a plea of nolo contendere at all. It is not recognized in English practice,
nor, I understand in the Canadian practice, but it has been recognized in our practice for a great many
years. Historically the plea of nolo contendere was made only as a preliminary to an arrangement or
any expectation that the punishment would be a fine and nothing more. . . ."; and remarks of the
Honorable Learned Hand: "I suppose it was well enough to keep nolo contendere .... As far as my
experience went it was a barbarous phrase and we had very vague ideas about it.").
12. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-16.010, 9-16.015
(2008). Some states do not just frown on Alford pleas, they prohibit them. See Carter v. State, 739
N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (Ind. 2000).
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should insist on proceeding to trial on any remaining charges." The
government views these kinds of no-admission pleas as casting doubt on
the legitimacy of public enforcement actions. It does not wish to be a
party to a proceeding in which a defendant has neither admitted to
having committed a crime nor has been found by a jury to have
committed one. 14
The Federal Rules disfavor nolo pleas too. Rule 11 states that a nolo

plea may be entered only "with the court's consent" and that "the court
must consider the parties' views and the public interest in the effective
administration of justice" before allowing such a plea.15 Wright and
Miller maintain that "it is far from clear that courts should be a party" to
a guilty plea proceeding in which there is no finding of a factual basis

for guilt.16
Criminal enforcers also use the inverse of this settlement structure.
Prosecutions may be settled with no attachment of liability but with
admission of wrongdoing. This is generally the form of deferred
This
prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements.
settlement structure originated in a movement to divert low-level drug
cases from the prison track but has come to be used, as is now wellknown, as the preferred form of resolution for corporate criminal
cases.' 7 In these settlements, liability does not attach unless something
goes badly wrong. Either charges are filed, held in abeyance, and later
dismissed if the defendant has complied with the agreement's terms, or
charges are never filed at all unless the defendant violates the deal. At
the time of settlement, however, the defendant is generally required to
agree to a detailed statement of facts that makes clear the defendant
violated the criminal law. This typically amounts to a fulsome
admission that strongly discourages the defendant from thinking that a
viable future option would be to violate the agreement and let the
13. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.440.

For a good

example of a full-dress DOJ argument that a nolo plea is against the public interest, see Government's
Opposition to Defendant Florida West's Motion to Enter a Plea of Nolo Contendere, United States v.
Fla. W. Int'l Airways, Inc., No. 10-20864-CR-SCOLA (S.D. Fla., May 10, 2012). See also Mark
Gurevich, Justice Department's Policy of Opposing Nolo Contendere Pleas: A Justification, 6 CAL.
CRim. L. REV. 2 (2004).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS' MANUAL

§ 9-27.440.

For the full

argument that nolo and Alford pleas undermine public confidence in accuracy, allow guilty persons to
avoid accepting responsibility for wrongs, and send equivocal moral messages, see Stephanos Bibas,
HarmonizingSubstantive-Criminal-Law-Valuesand CriminalProcedure: The Case of Alford andNolo
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361, 1363-64, 1382-1400 (2003).
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(a)(1), (a)(3); see also United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438, 440 (4th
Cir. 1974) (stating that a defendant has no right to enter a nolo plea just so he can avoid civil liability).
16. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., IA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES

OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES 8-14 § 175 (2008).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL
Arlen, supra note 2, at 146.

§§

9-28.200-1300;
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government prosecute.' 8
Sometimes nonprosecution agreements do not include an admission
of wrongdoing by the defendant. But this is rare. As with nolo and
Alford pleas, DOJ is reluctant to conclude a criminal matter without any
finding or concession of the fact of the matter of the defendant's
wrongdoing. The firm-level prosecution of the Arthur Andersen
auditing partnership, for obstructing the SEC's investigation of
accounting fraud at Enron Corporation, produced the rarities of both an
indictment and a trial of a large firm in part because Andersen declined
to agree to a nonprosecution settlement that would have required the
firm to make a factual admission of wrongdoing. 19
Settlements of civil public enforcement actions have fallen into a
somewhat different pattern. Take the SEC, for example. The standard
settlement of an SEC enforcement action brought in federal district court
is in the form of a consent decree in which the defendant "neither admits
nor denies" liability, while agreeing to the entry of an order by a federal
judge imposing various injunctive and financial penalties that the SEC
has authority to seek as sanctions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.2 0 This
pattern holds in both individual and corporate cases.21 It is a type of
settlement in which liability attaches, but there is no factual admission
of wrongdoing-like the nolo plea in a criminal case.22 (Unlike the
Alford plea, these settlements bar the defendant from walking straight
out of court and saying that no law was violated.)
18. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct
Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and
Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012) (including links to nonprosecution agreement and
statement of factual admission), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
19. See Kurt Eichenwald, Talks Break Down Between Andersen and Justice Department, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, at Al. As a participant in those negotiations while in a prior career in
government practice, I can report that the factual admission of wrongdoing was the primary reason the
firm proffered during negotiations for not signing a nonprosecution agreement before indictment and for
refusing a deferred prosecution agreement after indictment.
20. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, N.Y.-Based Investment Advisory Firm and Founder Settle
SEC Charges for Fraudulent Management of CDOS (Sept. 7, 2012), available at
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484620#.UldCZxblZsM; Press Release,
SEC, Oppenheimer Funds to Pay $35 Million to Settle SEC Charges For Misleading Statements During
Financial
Crisis
(June
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/I 365171482524#.UldDXRblZsM;
Press
Release, SEC, H&R Block Subsidiary Agrees to Pay $28.2 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
Subprime
Mortgage
Investments
(Apr.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/l 365171488676#.Uly-NRblZsM.
21. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Hedge Fund Manager to Pay $44 Million for Illegal Trading in
Chinese
Bank
Stock
(Dec.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/l365171486854#.UldFVhblZsM.
22. Once in a while DOJ takes the SEC approach, allowing a nolo plea in a corporate
prosecution in order to get resolution of the case in spite of parallel civil claims. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Invest. of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D. Conn. 1981).
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This is where recent debate over the settlement of SEC enforcement
actions comes in. Some judges, along with a handful of academics, 23
have questioned why public enforcement actions would be settled with
imposition of liability-including the theoretically exceptional sanction
of an injunction-but without any factual admission or finding of
wrongdoing. 24 Mary Jo White, the former federal prosecutor who has
taken up the chairmanship of the SEC, has said she intends to reduce the
SEC's uniform reliance on the no-admission settlement. 25
The recent pushback, if I may call it that, shares affinity with DOJ's
strong and longstanding stance against criminal guilty pleas and even
nonprosecution agreements that do not include factual admissions. 26
There is something troubling about a public enforcement action that
ends with a conclusion of "maybe he (they) did it, maybe he (they)
didn't, but he's (they are) paying a price for it in any event."
To understand this worry better, and see whether it is a serious one,
consider the relationship between settlements and deterrence and the
potential deterrent effects of the possible components of a public
enforcement settlement: liability, admission, remedy. The remedy
component has obvious effects that are usually the primary or sole focus
of deterrence analysis in this context. Sanctions-whether they take the
form of prison time, monetary penalties, injunctions restricting behavior,
terms of probation, or other common public law remedies-impose a
price on behavior that affects future calculations of cost by the
defendant and others similarly situated that, in optimal conditions, will
induce a decision to forego the behavior. This deterrent effect is
straightforward enough. It would seem not to depend in any way on
what kind of legal action is brought or whether a settlement involves
23. See Brief of Amici Curiae Sec. Law Scholars for Affirmance in Support of the District
Court's Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL
7009633, (2d Cir. 2012) (No. I1 -5227-cv).
24. See SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp 2d 328, 330-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Peter Lattman, Judge Is
Skeptical of S.E.C. Deal with Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Mar. 28, 2013, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/judge-questions-s-e-c-settlement-with-steven-cohens-hedgefund/; Corporate Crime Reporter, JudgeLeon, the SEC, IBM and the FCPA; CORP. CRIME RPTR., Jan.
at
available
3,
2013,
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/?s=judgeleon+the+sec+ibm+and+the+fcpa; Edward Wyatt, In
ChallengingS.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin Cites a Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2011, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/business/judge-in-wisconsin-challengessec-settlement.html.
25. See Yin Wilczeck, White Announces Revision of SEC "No Admit" Settlement Policy, 45
BNA SEC. REG. & LAW RPT. 1150 (June 24, 2013).
26. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

§§

9-28.100-9-28.1300;

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer Speaks at the New York
City
Bar
Association
(Sept.
13,
2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131 .html.
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attachment of liability or admission of wrongdoing-especially when
the defendant is a corporation, which cannot be imprisoned and for
which costs of doing business are highly fungible and carefully
monitored.
But, on analysis, liability and admissions do matter to deterrence.
Take liability first. Obviously, under many legal regimes, liability is a
condition precedent to the imposition of some forms of sanction. A
corporation can settle a dispute with the SEC by signing a contract with
the agency and writing a large check to the public fisc, without any court
having been the wiser. But a federal court is powerless to issue an
injunctive order relating to securities violations under the 1933 or 1934
Acts without formally saying that provisions of those statutory schemes
are being violated or are likely to be violated.27 Likewise, as known
from the comedic effect it produces in film and television, there is no
volunteering for prison.2 8 A criminal conviction is necessary for
imposition of a prison sentence, probation, and many other sanctions.
Liability itself contributes to deterrence because it exposes actors to
sanctions that cannot be invoked in liability's absence.
Liability also deters through its so-called collateral consequences.
This category of effects-or, if one prefers, sanctions-can be a bit
amorphous and is certainly highly diverse. For present purposes,
consider some easy, or core, examples. A felony conviction usually
disables a person from possessing a firearm or voting. If one values the
right to have a gun or cast a vote, one might hesitate marginally more
before breaking the law. Felony convictions in many regulatory
fields-government contracting, pharmaceutical manufacturing and
marketing, waste disposal, oil drilling, and so on-can lead to
presumptive or even automatic debarment or delicensing of a
corporation from doing business in certain product lines or in an entire
industry. 29 This is a potentially fatal sanction that gives firms in many
sectors an intense fear of prosecution. Finally, consider how the
attachment of liability in one legal proceeding can ease attachment of
liability in another. Liability in a public enforcement action might
unleash liability in a parallel private lawsuit through doctrines of
collateral estoppel or simply rules of evidence admission.
Then there are the reputational or stigmatic effects of liability. A jury

27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (2010).
28. Of course, under Alford, "An individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)
(emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a) (2002) (provisions for debarment of pharmaceutical
manufacturers for felony and misdemeanor convictions under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act).
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verdict of guilty is a powerful thing, but pleading guilty is a big deal
too-"a grave and solemn act" requiring the defendant, who "stands as a
witness against himself," to provide "an admission in open court that he
committed the acts charged in the indictment."30 A person or a firm that
the law has labeled a felon, a securities fraudster, or a polluter carries a
black mark that can affect others' willingness to transact with the
labeled person or firm in the future. Fear of this loss of reputational and
social capital can supply a strong motive to avoid violating the law. Of
course, reputational sanctions are a complex and opaque mattervarying as they do with the type of defendant, the sector of industry or
society involved, the nature of the law violation, and the future plans
and activities of the person or firm. But there can be no doubt that
reputational sanctions, despite problems of measurement, are real and
potent. 3' Nearly every day one can find a corporate manager
somewhere declaring that criminal liability of her firm is her greatest
fear, or a person under investigation vociferously maintaining in the
press that he is not a criminal and has done nothing wrong.
Turn next to admissions of wrongdoing. These too have a role in
deterrence, although specifying mechanisms here is somewhat more
challenging. Depending on how parallel legal regimes are structured, a
factual admission of wrongdoing in a public enforcement action could
lead to some of the same collateral consequences as a finding of
liability. To create a stylized example, a statutory framework might bar
the issuance of licenses by a government agency "to any person
convicted of a felony violation of section x of the Clean Water Act," or
instead "to any person who engages in unlawful conduct as defined in
section x of the Clean Water Act." To stay with the hypothetical, a
private plaintiff might be able to make evidentiary or estoppel use of a
corporation's conviction for violating the Clean Water Act or of a
corporation's agreement in a settlement document that it "discharged
without permit the following substances in the following amounts on the
following dates at the following locations: . . . ." Perhaps the latter,

more specific piece of evidence could even, in some circumstances, be
more probative than the former.
Reputational sanctions also can follow from a factual admission.
Again, the problem of observation and measurement is difficult, so there
is uncertainty here. Some evidence suggests that publicly traded firms

30. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to
Managersfor FinancialMisrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. EcoN. 193, 194 (2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D.
Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QuANT. ANALYSIS
581, 582 (2008); Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87
B.U. L. REv. 1021, 1025 (2007).
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caught violating the law suffer a greater decline in equity value upon
initial revelation of the facts of wrongdoing, such as through press
reports, than upon imposition of liability and sanctions in the legal
32
process. Perhaps counterparties, in deciding whether to transact in the
future, place more or at least additional weight on the nature and
specifics of a firm's misconduct than they do on what the law later has
to say about that conduct. If so, an admission to those facts by the
firm-which is best positioned to know the facts and most motivated to
deny their truth-might be expected to have particularly strong
reputational bite. Firms would therefore wish to avoid situations in
which such admissions might be necessary.
Two further instrumental mechanisms connected to admissions are
more speculative but could be exceedingly important. First, a firm's
public declaration of the nature and facts of its own wrongdoing might
spur more introspection and reform among the firm's managers,
employees, and owners than would a bare legal judgment in which a
firm simply concedes that its government litigation adversary has
something of a case, and the firm says it chooses to settle the whole
thing so it can "move on." Institutional admissions might be important
to institutional growth and reform, much as we seem to believe that
confession is crucial to individual rehabilitation and redemption.3 3
There is a connection back to the imposition of liability here: The
stigmatic effects on a firm of being found liable may be amplified, or
dampened, depending on how many, or how few, facts are admitted or
established about what precisely the firm did wrong.
DOJ certainly seems to believe in these mechanisms. It has generally
insisted on the inclusion of admissions in nonprosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements. One reason for this insistence, as discussed
above, is to deter firms from disregarding their reform and other
obligations under those agreements and attempting to return to the status
quo ante for a contest over the merits of the government's case. But
another reason is that DOJ explicitly uses nonprosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements as a means of bringing about reforms within
firms, designed to prevent future law violations without many of the
costs to both sides associated with full-blown prosecution. 34 DOJ does
not want to confer that leniency, or make that trade, without assurance

32. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The ReputationalPenalty Firms Bearfor
Committing CriminalFraud,36 J. LAW & EcoN. 757 (1993).
33. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function ofEntity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
507 (2006).
34. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer Speaks at

the

New

York

City

Bar

Association

(Sept.

13,

http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-12091 31 .html.

2012),

available

at
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that a firm-and specifically its managers-are fully and genuinely
committed to the project of corporate reform. It is understandable that
DOJ would adopt the common sense view that the first step to solving a
problem is to admit that one has it. Another benefit, for the government,
of obtaining an admission is to prevent any dispute about whether a
corporation should be viewed as a recidivist in the event of new law
violations in the future.
A final mechanism connected to admissions has to do with the
legitimacy of the public enforcement system generally. Going back to
the matter of nolo and Alford pleas, one reason federal prosecutors
frown on these arrangements is that they call into question the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 35 After all, if some people
who plead guilty are not admitting guilt, or are even vocally denying it,
doesn't that add further anxiety to the general worry about whether
innocent persons are prosecuted and even plead guilty? DOJ's position
is essentially this: "We are not interested in prosecuting innocent people.
We only bring cases in which we are convinced that the proof is
sufficient for the high burden in a criminal case. You can either admit
that you committed this crime or we will ask a jury to find that you did
it."
Prosecutors are doing this not just because they might take seriously
their obligation to see that justice is done in each case, but also because
they have a strong interest, as the dominant players in the deterrence
market, in maintaining the public legitimacy of their overall project.
Imagine a criminal justice system in which nolo and Alford pleas were
the norm. The public would have far less reason than it does at present
to believe that prosecutors bring meritorious cases, or to even think that
prosecutors care whether their charges have merit. If the enterprise of
public prosecution appears unprincipled or even random, then surely
deterrence is seriously weakened. Admissions in the settlement of
public enforcement actions have an important role in the legitimacy of
public enforcement and thus also in the deterrence of law violations.
II. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST DISPENSING WITH ADMISSIONS

Let us briefly take stock, and then see what conclusions might follow
about the particular questions that have been raised about SEC
enforcement practices. Public enforcement, particularly in the corporate
realm, is primarily designed to prevent future wrongdoing and is
overwhelmingly resolved by settlement. Deterrent effects can flow from
all three of the primary components of settlements: liability, admission,
35. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 1382-1400.
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and remedies. Public enforcers, working in both the criminal and civil
fields, have fashioned a variety of settlement structures that often
dispense with one or more of these components. Dispensing with
admissions has been disfavored in criminal cases. The deterrent effects
of admissions include those relating to collateral consequences,
reputational effects, and legitimacy of public enforcement.
The present worry about the SEC's enforcement practices is, to put
the point a bit too roughly, that they have produced the civil equivalent
of a plea bargaining system dominated by nolo pleas.3 6 The
overwhelming majority of serious SEC enforcement actions against
sizeable firms are resolved by way of an agreement with the following
structure: 37 The SEC files a civil complaint alleging violations of
various provisions (usually the antifraud provisions) of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. (The Citigroup case, in which the Second Circuit is now
reviewing Judge Rakoff's refusal to sign a requested injunction, is
typical.3 8 ) The complaint includes a lengthy description of what the
SEC believes it could prove about what the firm did if the case were to
proceed to trial. The SEC also files a consent decree with the court,
which is a settlement document signed by both enforcer and enforcee,
and which asks the court to order a series of remedies. In the consent
decree, the defendant states that it consents to the filing of the complaint
and the issuance of the injunctive order but neither admits nor denies
that it violated any securities law. The judge then signs an order that
requires the defendant to pay a sum of money to the SEC (up to
hundreds of millions of dollars in a big case), enjoins the defendant from
further violations of the securities laws (on penalty of contempt of the
order, in addition to the usual statutory penalties), and increasingly
often, requires the defendant to undertake some corporate reforms
designed to decrease the likelihood of future violations by its
employees. 39
This kind of settlement includes liability and remedies but no
admission. It has been criticized primarily on three grounds. First, it
has been said that the remedies are insufficient for adequate deterrence.
36. See Gurevich, supra note 13, at 14 (stating that corporate antitrust defendants are attracted to
nolo pleas because they are a "face-saving device" which can lessen effects on a firm's reputation and
allow it to contest wrongdoing in civil litigation), 33 (stating that white collar criminals are particularly
attracted to nolo pleas because they are more concerned with reputation and bad publicity).
37. See sources cited supranote 20.
38. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Citigroup and Two Executives for Misleading
Investors About Exposure to Subprime Mortgage Assets (July 29, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-136.htm; SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp
2d 328, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
39. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
3 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 793, 794 (2008); Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the CorporateMonitor in SEC
EnforcementActions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP FtN. & COM. L. 89 (2006).
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An injunction not to violate the law seems a bit redundant. True, its
effect is to place the firm in a kind of probationary status under which
the next violation could trigger sanctions simply on a showing of
contempt to the judge who signed the injunction, rather than on the fulldress proof required in a new enforcement lawsuit. But the trouble is
that the SEC virtually never asks courts to hold firms in contempt for
violating "don't break the law" injunctions. 4 0 In addition, it has been
claimed that the monetary penalties in these settlements are too often too
small to impose a serious economic consequence on firms.41 What is a
few hundred million dollars, which has been a long foreseeable result
during years of investigation, to the financial planning of a global
megafirm like Citigroup? Or so the thinking goes.
Second, SEC settlements have been criticized as squandering, without
good justification, all of the deterrence benefits of admissions of
wrongdoing.42 The SEC is a public enforcer, just like DOJ, and it
should want to create an enforcement environment in which its charges
are taken seriously and the merits of each charge have important
meaning for the reputations of firms and the legitimacy of the regulatory
system. After all, the whole framework of securities regulation was
designed to protect the common investor. The common investor, more
than anyone, would like her public officials to inform her, for example,
whether banks that had to be saved by government intervention during
the financial crisis triggered that same crisis through the use of fraud to
sell massive quantities of mortgage-backed securities and related
derivative products. And it is not just that the "neither admit nor deny"
two-step is harmful in a particular case. It is that the SEC has
institutionalized this practice to the point that it is a feature of every
settlement and does not appear even subject to bargaining. Nolo
contendere is par for the course. Or so the complaint goes.
Third, the use of these settlement practices against a background in
which the SEC takes almost none of its major corporate cases to trial
produces the worry that there is no meaningful check on the SEC's
process of imposing liability on regulated actors.4 3 How and when do
40. Brief of Amici Curiae Sec. Law Scholars for Affirmance in Support of the District Court's
Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 7009633 (2d
Cir. 2012) (No. I1-5227-cv), at 15-16.
41. See, e.g., Ezra Ross, The SEC's Band-Aid Solution and the Politics Behind It, THE
COLLECTION GAP: A BLOG ABOUT REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAILURE, July 2, 2012,
http://thecollectiongap.com/2012/07/the-secs-band-aid-solution-and-the-politics-behind-it/.
42. See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in
PROSECUTORS INTHE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 87,
90-96 (A. Barkow & R. Barkow eds., 2011).
43. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp 2d 328, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brief of
Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for the United States District Court, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc.,
2012 WL 3542014 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5375-cv), at *55. This argument has been most famously
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these allegations ever get tested, even under the most forgiving of
standards such as those applying to a motion to dismiss a complaint in a
civil lawsuit? It is more than a bit ironic that the SEC has answered the
criticism about settlements, including those without admissions, by
saying, in effect, that the SEC's allegations when it files complaints
have a seriousness and imprimatur that the public understands to mean
the defendant actually did what is alleged. Given that so few of the
SEC's allegations are tested in litigation, the possible mechanism for
such a public belief is elusive. Of course, the SEC would insist that its
rigorous internal review of enforcement actions, which require a
majority vote of the commissioners, confers a seal of quality on its legal
complaints.4 But that is not much different from prosecutors asserting
that they are not in the business of prosecuting innocent people. Or at
least that is how the SEC's critics would describe matters.
As deterrence remains the overriding theme in public enforcement,
the SEC's settlement practices ought to be evaluated from something
like the standpoint of cost-benefit analysis. Those, including the SEC
and Citigroup in their case before Judge Rakoff, who assert in blanket
fashion that judicial deference to a consent decree is a basic feature of
the Anglo-American lawsuit are badly eliding private and public law.
Public lawsuits are brought principally for the purpose of deterrence, not
compensation. Much analysis of the role of the consent decree in civil
litigation is simply inapposite here.45
It seems indisputable that the constant disposal of cases through
"don't break the law" orders with "neither admit nor deny" statements
from those said to have committed securities fraud gives up a great deal
of potential deterrent effects. The institutionalization of these practices
within the sometimes too clubby securities bar has the further effect of
cutting the judiciary and the investing public almost entirely out of the
process of public enforcement of securities law.4 6 Even if the SEC were
generalized to the full institution of settlement by Owen Fiss: "Settlement is the civil analogue of plea
bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the
absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done." Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1075 (1984).
44. See Brief of SEC, Appellant/Petitioner, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL
1790380 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 1l-5375-cv), at *57; Brief of Amicus Curiae Former SEC Gen. Counsel &
Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of District Court's Ruling, SEC v. Citigroup Global
Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 7009635 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. l1-5227-cv), at *13-14.
45. See generallyJudith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (1987).
46. See Fiss, supra note 43, at 1085 ("Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not
strangers chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the public
participates ... [whose] job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the
peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them.").
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making the right cost-benefit analysis in each case, and in sum across
all cases, that would seem to be undesirable as a matter of prudent
institutional arrangements.
And it is highly unlikely that the SEC is in fact getting the costbenefit analysis right. What the agency says is that it could not settle
cases if it did not settle them this way. Firms would refuse to deal,
primarily because the collateral consequences of factual admissions in
public enforcement actions can cripple firms, particularly in class action
litigation. The result would be more trials, and those trials would tend
to be big and expensive. The SEC would be forced to bring far fewer
enforcement actions, and overall deterrence would decline. The SEC
has determined, it says, that the public is better served by a broader and
shallower enforcement practice than a narrower and deeper one.4 7 And
it adds, with more than a touch of executive branch zeal, that Congress
meant to delegate to the SEC, and to the SEC alone, the question of how
best to allocate the government's limited enforcement resources.4 8
Suppose, unrealistically, that there were zero agency cost concerns
looming over our evaluation of the SEC's justifications for its practices.
Assume it is not true that enforcers like settlements for boosting case
statistics, generating press conferences, yielding checks with lots of
zeros attached, and building credibility with a defense bar that typically
hires enforcement attorneys to their next and higher-paying jobs.
Surely the SEC would still be overstating its case a bit, if not a lot. It
is hard to imagine that some change-any change-in settlement
practices would grind the securities enforcement machine to a virtual

halt. Only myopic cost-benefit analysis would view the problem as a
binary choice between lots of sanctions with no admissions and only
very few instances of sanctioning with admissions or findings of
wrongdoing. The SEC ought to have the creativity and the willingness
to find a way to bring lots of cases, and settle most of them, while still
pursuing some enforcement actions in which the full range of sanctions,
including those associated with an admission or finding of the facts, are
brought to bear. William 0. Douglas's "well-oiled shotgun behind the
door" is generally meant to stay behind the door, of course. 49 But it is
liable to rust and fall apart if it is not at least taken out and fired once in
a while.
What I am about to point out is counterintuitive. It happens also to be

47. See Testimony of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Hearing
Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators, House Committee on Fin. Servs., May
17, 2012, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts051712rk.htm.
48. See Brief of SEC Appellant/Petitioner, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL
1790380 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5375-cv), at *41-46.
49. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (J. Allen ed., 1940).
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true. Criminal prosecutors face a much steeper litigation slope than the
government's civil enforcement lawyers. The burden of proof is much
higher in criminal cases. Criminal provisions in regulatory schemes
often require proof of additional, more culpable mental states for
liability. Securities law is a good example, allowing the SEC to win
what is called a civil fraud case on a showing of mere negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence but requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of "willfulness" for a criminal fraud conviction.o And the
criminal process is filled with additional evidentiary hurdles and
procedural rights (not least the Fifth Amendment privilege) that can be
exploited by the defense to exclude evidence and make the adversary's
job harder than it would be in a civil suit.
Here is the counterintuitive part. Even though prosecutors have the
tougher litigation assignment, they seem far less willing to negotiate
away their cases on terms favorable to the defense. To be sure, the
access prosecutors have to more serious sanctions gives them a lot more
bargaining leverage. But their risk of trial loss is much higher. And the
consequences of trial loss-being labeled a reckless prosecutor who
indicted an arguably innocent person-are worse than for the
noncriminal enforcement lawyer. One would expect the SEC to drive
the harder bargain. But it is prosecutors who insist on admissions of
wrongdoing and seriously frown on nolo and A/ford pleas. And it is
prosecutors who seem more willing to go to trial and who may have
(this part is perhaps not counterintuitive) the better success rate at trial.
The most recent notable losses for the government in securities fraud
cases have been in trials contested by the SEC.s"
It might be true that a sudden about-face, in which the SEC decided to
require admissions in every one of its settlements, would bring the
enforcement process to a halt. Of course, that would be true in criminal
cases too. If criminal defendants across the land managed to solve their
collective action problem one morning and all refused to plead guilty at
once, the conveyor belt to America's prisons would shut down. 52 That
is why prosecutors do not take a one-size-fits-all approach to settlement.

50. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1 (2010); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2002); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
701-02 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
51. See Nathaniel Popper & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Money-Market Pioneer and Son Cleared
ofFraud,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2012, at B 1; Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragementfrom Jury That
Ruled
Against
It,
DEALBOOK,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
3,
2012,
available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that-ruled-against-it/;
Walter Pavlo, SEC Loses Insider Trading Case-You Can't Win Em All, FORBES, June 21, 2011,
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavio/2011/06/21/sec-loses-insider-trading-case-youcant-winem-all/.
52. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ornri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (PleaBargain)Dilemma, I J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 737 (2009).
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Some cases warrant pursuit of full sanctions, even if that means costly
and difficult trials. And some do not. The sun would still rise over
Washington and New York the next day if the SEC took a major,
message-worthy enforcement case or two and insisted on more fines and
an admission of the facts of wrongdoing-or, for that matter, if it asked
a judge to sanction a company for violating the terms of an injunction.
Perhaps that is what Mary Jo White now has in mind.5 3
Of course firms would resist such terms, largely for fear of the
consequences in civil litigation. 54 But settlement would not disappear as
an institution. Either the cases would go to trial or they would settle
eventually, on slightly less punitive terms or in conjunction with
settlement of related private lawsuits. Charging and settlement practices
change, bargaining leverage shifts, incentives adjust, and a new
equilibrium is reached. This is in the nature of a litigation market.55
What, then, of the role of the federal courts in all of this? After all,
recent discussion of SEC enforcement practices has focused not only on
the SEC's ways of doing business, but also on whether federal judges
should have a meaningful role in public enforcement actions that take
place in their courts. Some argue that the injunctive power is serious
and exceptional, and judges would be right to say that they do not issue
such orders unless they are satisfied, at some standard of review, that the
allegations giving rise to invocation of injunctive power have merit.5 6
Others point to a long practice in the federal courts of welcoming parties
who wish to resolve their disputes by way of consent decree and
deferring to the adversaries' informed judgment about the merits of the
case and its proper resolution.5
53. See Yin Wilczeck, White Announces Revision of SEC "No Admit" Settlement Policy, 45
BNA SEC. REG. & LAW RPT. 1150 (June 24, 2013).
54. See Yin Wilczek, Defense Bar Reacts with Dismay at Revision of SEC "No Admit/Deny"
Policy,45 BNA SEC. REG. & LAW RPT. 1150 (June 24, 2013).
55. The SEC has recently been touting that it has made a change in settlement policy, requiring
firms to admit liability if they are also pursued by DOJ and have been criminally convicted. See Brief of
SEC, Appellant/Petitioner, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 1790380 (2d Cir. 2012) (No.
11-5375-cv), at *48 & n.21. That is hardly a sea change.
56. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brief of
Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for the United States District Court, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc.,
2012 WL 3542014 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. ll-5375-cv), at *40; Brief of Amici Curiae Sec. Law Scholars
for Affirmance in Support of the District Court's Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 7009633 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227-cv), at *5-6; see also
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) ("In cases where the Commission is seeking to enjoin a
person . . . the Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary predicate to show that . . . future
violation may occur"; "a district court may consider scienter or lack of it as one of the aggravating or
mitigating factors to be taken into account in exercising its equitable discretion in deciding whether or
not to grant injunctive relief.").
57. See, e.g., Brief of SEC, Appellant/Petitioner, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL
1790380 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. ll-5375-cv), at *24--25; Brief of Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 1790381 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. I1-5375-cv), at *23-25.
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I am not a scholar of civil procedure and do not pretend to have a
theory of the judicial role in settlement of lawsuits. But the analysis of
settlement of public enforcement actions supplied here would at least
add weight to the argument for meaningful judicial review. Much of
what I have said might be boiled down to the point that the more serious
enforcement actions are, the more seriously they will be taken. If
deterrence is the goal, we ought to be interested in enhancing the
meaningfulness of enforcement actions. A stream of similar, rubberstamped settlement contracts inevitably will be seen as less meaningful
than a series of judicial orders, each of which comes with a judge's
explanation of why she thinks the evidence of a firm's violation of the
securities laws is compelling enough to justify placing that firm under a
federal court's injunctive control.58 Another point relevant to deterrence
is that, as Owen Fiss argued in his famous criticism of consent decree
practice, a judge is much less likely to hold somebody in contempt for
violating an injunction if the judge never had much involvement in
determining the factual basis for that injunction in the first place.5 9
As with many problems of law reform, Congress could probably
wave its statutory wand and make this happen, simply by adding some
language to the enforcement provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
explicitly providing for judicial review.60 The statutory scheme
governing the use of consent decrees in the settlement of Superfund
actions might be a starting place for a model. It includes many more
directives to enforcers than the 1933 and 1934 Acts.6 ' And judicial
involvement appears to have been more substantive as a result. 62 In the
meantime, which might be a long time, I would say that if the law of
civil procedure turns out to be not so clear about the extent of a trial
judge's power to question the basis for an injunction, or even her power
to ask the parties for more of a factual showing before signing one, then
plaudits to the judge who asserts the existence of that authority and to
the appellate court that defers to its exercise.

58. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Former SEC Gen. Counsel & Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of
District Court's Ruling, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2012 WL 7009635 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 115227-cv), at *28 (suggesting form of judicial review of consent decree settlements that would
approximate the sort of factual proffer used at guilty plea proceedings).
59. Fiss, supranote 43, at 1084.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (2010); see also SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1216 (1lth Cir.
2004) (describing the factors required to be established for a court to issue an injunction in an SEC
enforcement proceeding).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2002).
62. See Beth I. Z. Boland, Comment, Consent Decrees Under the Superfund Amendments and
ReauthorizationAct of 1986: ControllingDiscretion with Procedure, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 451, 46367(1987).
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III. CONCLUSION
It is a tautology to say that settlement of public enforcement actions
should further the public interest. But the routinizing of settlement
practices can cause institutions and enforcers to lose sight of the public
interest, or forget to continue to ask how to further that interest in each
case they bring. When required in the disposition of enforcement
actions, admissions of wrongdoing have several instrumental public
benefits. There are costs involved. But it is implausible to maintain that
those costs are so great as to make it necessary to dispense altogether
with admissions, so that they vanish from the courts and cannot be
discussed as a bargaining chip in crafting settlements designed to deter
corporate wrongdoing. Maybe civil enforcers should not mimic their
criminal counterparts, who have nearly banned nolo and Alford pleas.
But they could learn something from thinking about why the criminal
justice system has such distaste for that kind of settlement.

